# NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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INTERVIEW OF:
R. SILVA

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MARCH 8, 2004

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(Transcript produced from audio CD provided by the

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National Transportation Safety Board.)

#### P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2:20 p.m.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Good afternoon. My name is Tom ROTH-ROFFY (phonetic sp.). The time is about 20 minutes after 2:00 on March the 8th, 2004 and we're here to interview the Fleet Captain of Seaport Taxi.

Good afternoon, sir.

MR. SILVA: Good afternoon.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: What I'd like now is -well, let me just do an introduction. We're -- I'm
with the National Transportation Safety Board and
we're investigating the accident that occurred aboard
the Lady D on March 6th, 2004 and the National
Transportation Safety Board is doing a safety
investigation. We are not concerned with any legal
aspects of this accident. Strictly interested in
improving safety.

What I'd like is for everybody here to -to introduce themselves starting with you, sir.

MR. SILVA: Ron Silva, Fleet Captain, Seaport Taxi.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Lieutenant Commander Mark Hammon, Coast Guard Activities,

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Baltimore.

MR. NARIZZANO: Ed Narizzano, Seaport Taxi Director.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. With that, we'll go ahead and start.

Ron, if you would please, tell me what your current position is and -- and what those -- what your duties are.

MR. SILVA: I'm Fleet Captain for the Seaport Taxi Fleet. The -- my responsibilities include supervision management, boat maintenance, boat repair scheduling. All under the direction or Ed Narizzano, the Director of Seaport Taxi.

The -- the overall position is -- is kind of fluid in -- in many ways. Under Ed's direction, I -- I cover many of the same things Ed does. Most particularly the maintenance things. I quite often have to defer to Ed's expertise the -- for the day-to-day activities and the day-to-day maintenance and calls down on the pier. I'm pretty comfortable with the operation of the boat. It's the mechanical -- the engine and mechanical stuff primarily that Ed can tell me in his sleep, but it'll take me two hours to figure out.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. And how long have 1 2 you been in your current position? 2001. MR. SILVA: MR. ROTH-ROFFY: About what month? Do 5 you recall? SILVA: Probably would have been 6 MR. June or July. Ed was the Fleet Captain 7 June/July. 8 when I came back that year. When Ed was promoted to 9 Director, I became Fleet Captain. 10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So, Ed was the 11 predecessor in your position --12 MR. SILVA: That's correct. 13 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- as Fleet Captain and 14 tell us -- tell me about your -- your -- your work 15 experience, your educational and training background if you could please. 16 17 MR. SILVA: Okay. At one point in time, 18 I considered myself semi-retired. My original -- I 19 originally started out working in social work. Worked for the city of Cambridge for 11 years in 20 21 delinquency prevention and control. From there, I 22 went to Harvard Community Health Plan which is a 23 large HMO in the New England area. I was the

Director of Facilities and Facilities Manager

Harvard Community Health Plan for about ten years.

Ι During that process, received Bachelor's Degree in Business Administrative and a Master's Degree in Urban Affairs and Certificates Graduate in Adult Education and Training.

At the point in time where I decided that I was going to more actively pursue my early retirement, I purchased a CSY -- a 40-foot CSY. It's 52 overall. Again, fitting her out as a six-pack charter boat and got my first Coast Guard license. That was '89 I believe.

From there on, I've had various positions with charter companies and on -- on other vessels culminating in the current position with Seaport Taxi.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So, if you could go back to 1989 and describe a little more detail about -- about, you know, the different jobs that you did in the -- in the marine --

MR. SILVA: Well, as I said, initially I fit out my own vessel as a crew charter boat and operated as a crew charter boat with -- within other fleets including the Boy Scouts of America, ABC

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Charters, Key Sail Charters and from there, I went to the ABC Charter Fleet in New Port Richey on the west coast of Florida. Operated in the Gulf of Mexico down into and through the Keys.

Within a very short period of time, I was a Fleet Captain for ABC Charters. I stayed with them until the -- the owner basically bankrupt the company. From there, I move on to the Show Queen which is a 200 passenger dinner cruise boat. It operates in the coastal waterways, in the clear water area. Also operated their -- for a short period of time, operated their dolphin tour boat that operated in the Gulf of Mexico as well as their two sailboats that -- one was a 12 passenger. One was a 16 passenger boats. They also went to the Gulf of Mexico.

From there, I went to Sea Coast Charter Company as their Fleet Captain. I worked with them for two and a half year.

Oh, in -- in the middle there, I did a couple of months in the Gulf as a crew boat captain.

Not a good thing to do.

Then I went on to Fort Myers Beach as second captain on a gambling boat and operating

1 engineer underway. Was a Panamanian flight vessel. 2 And from there, I went back into private 3 charter for about a year or two, actually a year and then I started working for Seaport Taxi which would 5 have been right when they bought. I was one of the 6 first captains they hired. 7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So, you started 8 with Seaport Taxi as a -- as a captain. 9 MR. SILVA: Yes. 10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Which boats did you run 11 as a captain? 12 MR. SILVA: All of them. In -- in -- in the first year after the company was purchased from 13 14 Mr. Morgan, there was a considerable amount of repair 15 and restoration work necessary on the boats. consequently, you either ran everything or you didn't 16 do much. 17 18 My primary boat was the Revenge at the 19 time which is what we refer to as the three boat and 20 that was the Fort McHenry route. MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Did you operate the Lady 21 22 D? 23 MR. SILVA: Yes, I have. I did then and I -- I have since. 24

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You have. Okay. Quite a -- quite a background in the marine industry. Amazing.

MR. SILVA: It's -- it probably sounds more extensive than it really is. Most of the -- the fleet captain job for a couple of years apiece, but the -- most of the bigger boats were a year, a year and a half, maybe two. That's a -- I can't say this on the tape, but the -- it's an interesting industry in Florida. Let's put it that way.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. If you would, tell me a little about what you know of the history of the -- the Lady D mechanically, operationally last say couple of years that you've been working with it. Do you recall any specific problems?

MR. SILVA: The Lady D's always been a -somewhat of a preferred boat in the fleet. It's one
of our smaller boats. It's also an enclosed boat.
So, it's an all-weather vessel.

Consequently, it -- it does have a high utilization value to it. Because of that, it's -- it's always been a 12-month year -- 12 month out of the year boat and it gets the -- the consequent maintenance and -- and operating time and when

going to go away and and what boat's operate, the  Lady D would obviously get preferential treatment in  in repair and refit because of using it all-year  round. So, she's she's maintained.  In in my opinion, she's maintained in a high
in repair and refit because of using it all-year round.  So, she's she's maintained.  In in my opinion, she's maintained in a high
round. So, she's she's maintained.  In in my opinion, she's maintained in a high
In in my opinion, she's maintained in a high
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mechanical state not necessary a high aesthetic.
We've been trying to get some carpet residue off the
floor of that boat for a year and a half. I mean
it's not it's not as high a priority as as
keeping the boat running and keeping it safe.
MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Do you recall any
any particular problems with the boat mechanically
or operationally the last couple of years?
MR. SILVA: No. Ed's already mentioned
that the the maintenance program since Ed became
that the the maintenance program since Ed became part of Seaport Taxi has been a proactive maintenance
part of Seaport Taxi has been a proactive maintenance
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part of Seaport Taxi has been a proactive maintenance program.  If a boat goes down for any length of period any period of time, it's because parts

If the boat isn't operating in a -- in a

safe and efficient manner, it doesn't go out and more often than not, that particular boat because of its high utility for us, gets fixed relatively quickly. It's not a boat we can let stand because we use it so much.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. In your present job, how much interaction do you have with the -- the captains of the other boats? Do you supervise them or --

See -- with the exception of MR. SILVA: right now one captain who works Friday nights only, I see every single captain every single week. every single mate every single week and for the most part, I have words with every single captain, every single mate every single week. I make a -- I make a point of doing that. So, I'm -- a combination of -of comment, commentary or transferring operational information to them, questioning them about something I might have found on one of their reports or asking them questions about something that I found under the boat or it might be as -- it might be as -- as minute as why is the -- why is he still trashing your boat? You know, I mean it may be that conversation and it -- it may be a change in policy on -- on what of kind

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tickets we take or it may be a question as to their availability or extending the hours or asking to fill in for somebody.

But, there's -- I have a conversation with every one of them once a week.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Are some better than others or are they all --

MR. SILVA: Sure they are.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. How would you rate the captain of the Lady D at the time of the accident? How did he fit into there? Into your -- your mix?

MR. SILVA: Frank's a -- Frank's a competent captain at the level he's at. Frank would like to expand to large boats. I've got out with Frank on larger boats. I've talked to Frank about it. We've done some test runs on the larger boats. I don't think Frank -- number one, I don't think he's ready for the larger boats and number two, I don't think it's an appropriate placement for him.

He handles a small boat well. He's a good captain. He's a reliable. He's great with customers, but I -- I just don't see him going up to the biggest boats in the fleet which is what he would

like to do.

And I've had conversations with him to that affect and he's -- you know, he's -- he's comfortable with the concept that he's doing a good job where he is and -- and why put himself in harms way to go to a -- a boat that's twice as big as what he's currently operating.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So, what -- what are his specific problems with operating the bigger boats?

MR. SILVA: The -- the twin -- the twin screw concept and the larger size of the boat and the -- the confusion of the bigger boats. That's my opinion of it.

And Frank knows exactly what to do now to get the one boat to do what he wants it to do. He's not there with the larger boats and I just frankly don't have the time to -- to dedicate the number of hours it would take to get frank to that confidence level on a bigger boat.

If I tell him what to do on a little single screw boat, it's done. He knows how to do it. He's done it a hundred times.

The same -- the same physical maneuver on

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a twin screw bigger boat does not get him the same results and the learning curve that it's going to take to get him to the point where he understands that is -- is just beyond our resources right now to be honest. Which is -- in -- in no way takes away from his ability to operate the boat he's on. So.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: What is your understanding of the company's foul weather operating procedure? If there's bad weather, how is that communicated to the rest of the boats?

MR. SILVA: The protocol I use and -- and the protocol that is commonly in place whether I'm there or not -- I'll check the weather every morning before I come in and that's just something I've done for years.

If there's indication on the weather that there's something that could be coming through that day or any indication in the radar patterns that — that there's a potential, I'll alert Kathy or whoever else is in the office that, you know, we probably may have to — we may have to get into a situation where we're going to look at the radar this afternoon. Depending on whether I'm on the — on the water or whether I'm working on the boats or there's different

places that I'm physically at.

Typically, I'll alert Kathy or whoever's in the office that I think there might be something coming that day. In the event I see it or someone else sees it, Kathy's aware that it -- that it might be happening and/or she's already checked it one or two times for her own benefit to see if there's anything out there.

In the event I'm on the water, I'll often call back to the office and say Kathy bring up the radar. We got something coming in from the west. I'd like to know what it looks like and she'll read it back to me and give me a sense of the speed of it and the color, you know, color notes on it.

All the captains understand that their first priority is the safety of their passengers and the vessel and all the captains understand they're never going to be called down by Ed or I if they prematurely put their boat to a bulkhead and the wind doesn't come or the storm doesn't come. They're not going to get chastised for that. So.

Typically, if I am on the water or Ed's on the water, he or I will make the call to the bulkheads. If we have advance radar information

because we were anticipating something, we probably call them in early. We usually call them in before it gets to us rather than wait for it.

In the event we get struck with something out there, now I'm typically on the inside loop. So, if it's coming from the west to the east which primarily is -- is our direction right now, I'll make the call to put the boats in a bulkhead. Discharge your passengers. Explain to your passengers as soon as the lightning passes, the wind passes, the storm however -- whatever particular set of circumstances it is, tell your passengers we'll be resuming service and we'll be resuming service to the full extent of our -- our hours tonight. That we will not be operating until the lightning stops, the -- the visibility improves, the wind will stop, you know, whatever it is.

Typically, that's confirmed and when I'm out on the water, I usually ask for a role call of the boats to make sure everybody heard me and almost always there's a special effort made for the outside boats to make sure they did get the transmission.

So, that's -- that's pretty much it.

MR. NARIZZANO: I just -- I just thought

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of something as far as, you know, whether Kathy -- Ed Narizzano, Director. My office supervising manager, Kathy, has in her -- in her desk top on a computer the weather bug which is -- has weather alerts flash constantly. So, she fires that thing up even hours before the crews get there so that any -- any storm warnings that are on there it -- it quakes and beeps and then she goes to radar. It wouldn't surprise me if that wasn't what may have prompted her to put up the -- the (inaudible).

That's -- that's built into her starter program. She pushes the button to start it up it's there.

She also has some experience on the water. Unfortunately, she can't sit for her license. She was ready to go. She had -- has a knee problem. So, she's waiting to get that corrected. So, she wants to get her ticket to, but she's very good at what -- yes, at being knowledgeable of weather conditions and all. She's a schooner girl. Just ask her.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Now, sometimes you also operate the boats, Ron?

MR. SILVA: It is atypical for me not to

operate a boat every week. It is more typical for me to operate at least one day. In -- in this schedule, at least one day and it's not uncommon for me to operate as many as three (inaudible).

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So, you -- you spend quite a bit of time on the boats as well as --

MR. SILVA: Oh, yes, it's built into the process. I want to be out there. I want to see what they're doing. I want to see what's going on. I want to see how the boats are being handled. I want to see what the traffic's like. I want to feel what the boat's doing and quite often, I'll flip flop on the boats.

The boat I prefer to drive is the eight boat, but more often than not, I'll give that to somebody else and take a boat. If somebody said, you know, the engine -- the engine sounded weird to me last night. What do you mean? It just sounded weird. So, I'll give somebody else the eight boat and I'll take the "weird" boat and see if I can figure out what -- what weirdness it is.

Now, and it's -- sometimes it's -- it's as stupid as a large piece of plastic hooked into the bottom of a pontoon. You know, the way you splashed

it up and it's -- it's -- parts of it's hanging in the water and brrrrrr and nothing's doing anything except that I mean, but you -- you can't -- the captain couldn't tell if he heard a noise, didn't understand it, couldn't find it, reported it and it took me awhile to find it, too, that particular one. But, that's -- that's typical of -- of what would happen. It's also typical for -- for use to be a situation where we had x number of boats scheduled to operate on a given day and for whatever reason, the -- the customer demand is considerably higher than we expected and I'll -- I'll take a boat under even Ιf though I'm not scheduled. there's available, I'll take the boat out and again, it's -it's whatever is there. My ticket's big enough to drive anything in the fleet. So. MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And you say you -- you prefer the eight boat. Why is that? MR. SILVA: Well, it's beautiful. MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Is it one of the bigger boats --Well, it's the one -- it's MR. SILVA:

the one with the twin inboard diesels.

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MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay.

MR. SILVA: It's prestige. No other reason. Going to be honest. It's the best looking, biggest boat in the fleet. What do you want?

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And you -- you mentioned that if you saw a weather problem you would call it to the attention of the woman in the -- in the office.

MR. SILVA: If -- for instance, if I were coming back from Fells Point which is -- this time of the year is the most typical scenario, I'd leave people at Fells Point. I'd turnaround. I'd start back into Harbor Place. In that process, you're facing into the -- the west -- the southwest area which is where most of our heavy weather comes from this time of the year.

You make your turn and you -- it's very clear by the way. It's -- there's a very definitive line there also over the -- over Federal Hill. If I see something out there that doesn't look right, I'll call in to Kathy and ask her to call the radar up and see if she can identify what it is and identify the colors and the radar we use has -- we use has a time lapse bar and you can change the duration of the

time. You can tell how fast it's moving through a combination of -- of spotting it and watching the time lapse.

So, I'll ask -- you know, I'll ask Kathy, you know, what scale have you got it on? How -- how -- how much did it move? Half the distance? You know, so I can get a feel for -- for how fast it's coming at us and I'll ask her what the color differentiations are in the band to get a sense of how severe it might be.

But, that's an ideal scenario. That gives us plenty of advance warning and I can give specific directions to specific boats. To whoever's in Fells Point now, I want you to leave Fells Point and continue to do your drop offs. I except that you're going to get to Science Center. Don't go to Harbor Place. Stand hard Science Center. Whoever's in Harbor Place stand hard there and, you know, you get a -- you get a little more lead time better than just having five boats push against the bulkhead with sometimes as many as 600/700 people between the ones that are waiting and the ones you got in the boat looking at you going what's going on. It gives you -- it just gives you a little more lead time to -- to

1 create an operation scenario. 2 But, in the spring and in the summer, 3 it's more often than not put them to the bulkheads Tie them down. You don't get any -- you don't 5 get the lead. You know, just -- you know, we just get lightning all of a sudden and -- and we won't 6 7 operate in -- in lightning in the area, you know, and 8 it'll be just that fast. Wherever you are now, put 9 it to a bulkhead and tie it down. 10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Who -- who 11 company interfaces with the Coast Guard in terms of 12 inspections? Ed as the Director is the 13 MR. SILVA: primary person and then myself as the secondary. 14 15 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So, both of you dealt with the Coast Guard in scheduling 16 have inspections and -- and --17 MR. SILVA: No pun, but it's taken two of 18 19 us. MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And would you normally 20 21 accompany the -- the Coast Guard inspector when they 22 -- when they go through the inspection of the boat? It is more typical for me to 23 MR. SILVA:

be there than not.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. And each of your boats is inspected once a year or how does that work?

MR. SILVA: Each of our boats has an annual which i.e. is, you know, once a year. They also have -- the vast majority of them have five year hull inspections. Every fifth year, there's a hull inspection of the vessel. I believe we have one that's three years now. The brand new one that hasn't extended to five or it just got extended to five.

MR. NARIZZANO: That's why I write stuff down. I don't remember.

Typically, they're all Yes. MR. SILVA: We're not in soft water here. fives. We're in brackish water. If we were in -- if we were in fresh water, it would be one standard. If we were in salt water, it would be another standard. We're brackish water. So, it's -- you know, it gets played out, but the annual inspection what they call a tropsland inspection is due every year within 90 days of the certificate date and we were scheduled for five of those vessels to be inspected this week including the -- the one that brought me here.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And what about the --

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1 the five-year hull? Do you know the last time that 2 was done on the -- on the Lady D? MR. SILVA: I don't have it in front of 4 We can look it up. It's -- I've got a -- I've 5 got a master list at my desk that -- that lists the COI date, the hull date for everybody. It is not due 6 7 this year I don't believe. I would have read -- find 8 it if it was due this year. So, I'm -- I'm thinking 9 it's not due this year. 10 MR. NARIZZANO: I'm guessing 2001. 11 MR. SILVA: Yes. 12 MR. NARIZZANO: Maybe go a little --If it was built -- if it was 13 MR. SILVA: 14 built in '96, it would be five-year intervals. 15 mean that's -- that would be the standard procedure. 16 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And do you recall when the last time was? I think you did say the last time 17 18 was out of the water when you did the repairs on --19 on the stern area. Did -- did you clean the hull at 20 that time or -- or not? 21 MR. SILVA: I was not -- and I don't know 22 why, but I wasn't here. I may have been on vacation 23 or it -- it may have been -- it was a section last 24 fall where I had to make up use or lose it kind of

time. So, there were three days in a row where I was off for about a month or so.

MR. NARIZZANO: Tom, I -- I -- I can help you there. I had that boat up there to have the boating repair done. That boat has been scheduled or was scheduled to have the bottom done paint, sinks, the whole thing. That was the pontoons. The top side would be dull green and appearance, you know, a maintenance to scrape the mussels that are on the bottom of the thing at -- they -- and I wasn't -- I didn't think it was worth doing in the late fall, you know, and knock some of them off briefly and then --

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Right.

MR. NARIZZANO: -- we'll paint it up bright and shiny for the springtime after, you know, when the weather gets warmer. Painting cold aluminum is not good.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Right. Okay. Okay. I guess what I'd like to know is -- turn to you now is the -- the day of the accident. If you could tell me kind of what -- what you did that morning and, you know, how you -- how and when you learned of -- of the accident and how you responded.

MR. SILVA: Well, I laid in bed and drank

a couple of cups of coffee. It may proceeded -- my day off. Saturday was my day off.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay.

MR. SILVA: Ed and I split the weekends.

Ed -- Ed worked Friday/Saturday. I work

Sunday/Monday. So.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I was on my boat. Heard what I thought was hail on my boat. It was either hail or heavy rain. Went up into the cockpit to —to see if I could figure out what was going on initially and typically, I'll get out on my back deck and look to see my boats — to see if there's anything moving about. If they are, I'll got yell at them because I'm close. I'm right there.

I'm a beam of his room. I can see every trip he makes to Fort McHenry.

Anyway, when I popped my head up, one of our captains who is also a live-aboard, his wife who is also a mate of ours lived -- right now they live in the boat in front of me. All the boats are packed together for the winter and she yelled back to me. She was monitoring 71 because her husband was driving. She yelled back to me there's a problem with the one boat.

I went back down below and put my VHF 1 2 radio on. Called John Glenn (phonetic sp.) who was 3 our senior captain in the water at the time. I had already talked to you. 5 MR. NARIZZANO: Yes. MR. SILVA: I had already talked to Ed. 6 7 Ed -- I knew Ed was at Anchor Bay. I called you 8 about something. I can't remember what it was. 9 But, anyway --10 MR. NARIZZANO: Wanted (inaudible) paint 11 for that --12 MR. SILVA: That's right, too. It's hard to tell when -- I called in to tell him to bring some 13 14 paint out. 15 MR. NARIZZANO: Had some skin repair on the ten boat and you needed a touch up and get 16 striping and lettering back on. 17 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So, you were actually 18 19 working on your day off? 20 MR. SILVA: No. Anyway, Mary -- Mary 21 yelled back there is a problem with the one boat. 22 Went down. Got on the VHF. Called John Glenn. 23 John, what's going on? He said I'm not sure. 24 understand the one boat's got a problem.

Grabbed my jacket. Told John to -- as soon as he could clear his boat of passengers, he said he was clear. He had already dropped everybody off. I said come out to -- come out to Henderson to pick me up at the T-head.

By the time I got to the T-head, John was there. I jumped on the boat. At that point, we could begin to see the activity out by the -- the cement plant and I directed John to continue into the middle of the activity.

As we got closer, we could see the landing craft had -- had people with -- with floatation devices on and then we saw -- we were looking for the one boat. We didn't realize we were looking for the pontoons. Then -- then we saw the pontoons.

At that point, there was a police boat, a Coast Guard zodiac, a fireboat, the Navy Reserve boat, a small private crawler, all in that immediate circle.

I directed John to take a pass through the middle of the -- most of the boats were either converging or re-converging at that point. The police boat had already dropped the -- the 60-year-old lady off at -- at Korean War Memorial. He

was on his way back out.

We went through the middle of it. Looked. Didn't see anything. Obviously, there was enough equipment in the -- in the immediate area of hull. So, there was no need for us to -- to congest the area any further.

I directed John to follow the debris out the river. We followed the debris, the mate, myself, and John, all three of us in a lookout capacity didn't see anything in debris field other than debris at that point. Went about a hundred yards past the debris field up to the hospital ship and then began a z-pattern search back through the debris field.

Got back to the scene. At -- at that point, the landing barge was gone. The large fireboat had taken the hull or they were in the process of tying the hull off to the fireboat.

I directed John to do another z search back out. When we got back to the hospital ship, we did a 180. Somewhere in all that confusion, I spoke with the Coast Guard about the number of passengers on board. I spoke with our fort person about the number of people we left. We had on the boat.

I spoke to the park people about a

secondary boat that I had standing by to take the remainder of the fort guests back in. Spoke to the office about getting transportation back out there since we couldn't land a boat. It was too much activity to land a boat.

I had three cell phones and three radios going. A lot was going on.

Finally, communicate with the Coast Guard to the point where they understood the total number of passengers on board the vessel and one more time went back to the end of the debris field and notified the Coast Guard that I was going to be picking up all PFDs and other floatation that could be confused for a person in the water for an aerial search.

So, we worked our way back in picking up all of the debris that we could find that would -- could be confused as a -- a passenger.

Finished picking all that up. No, we get about halfway through that and a Coast Guard zodiac pulled up along side. A gentleman came into the boat and asked for the interior configuration of the Lady D because he had divers about to do in to check the inside of the boat. I gave him a rough sketch and a -- and a verbal description and sent him back to the

fireboat letting him know that we were monitoring 71 and 22 if they needed any additional information.

And I mistakenly obviously misunderstood what he said to me at that point because I specifically said to him do you want us to continue our search pattern and I thought he said no, we have them all. Now, what he may have said is we have it or we have it under control or something to that affect. I left there with the -- under the misimpression that everybody was out of the water.

So, we did our final sweep and picked up the last of the float -- the last of the ship in the water and went back through the Fort McHenry area to talk to the fireboat and ask them if there was anything I could do to assist them and they said no and we -- we brought the boat in.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Did you make the count of how many PFDs that -- that you did pick up?

MR. SILVA: No, they were all tied together on that one line. When we came in, I instructed the mate to string all of the PFDs on a -- on a line and tie them to the side of the boat so they dried out and be available for whatever and subsequent to that Ed -- Ed -- Ed tied the line

1 together with all the PFDs on the line. So, they 2 just recovered those. MR. NARIZZANO: Yes, I was instructed to 4 secure them and lock there the line. 5 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Uh-hum. MR. NARIZZANO: I was putting them unto 6 7 the houseboat and lock --8 MR. SILVA: Lieutenant --9 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Varanouski (phonetic 10 sp.)? 11 MR. SILVA: Varanouski picked them up. 12 He was picking them up just now. 13 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And how many PFDs were on board the -- the vessel? 14 15 MR. SILVA: There were 26 adult and I 16 believe ten or 11 child. We had just -- we had just done the -- the mate who was on the boat that day, 17 18 Mike, he was assigned as a maintenance mate during 19 that week and on Tuesday of that week, I had assigned Mike to work on that prep boat -- to prep that boat 20 21 for the Coast Guard inspection. 22 Part of what I tried to do and -- and 23 it's the same reason that Mike was on the boat on a 24 Saturday, Mike is an incoming captain. He's got his

ticket. He can operate that boat. I've been on the boat with him. I've taken him on test runs. He's capable of operating the boat. I wanted to get him as familiar with the boat as I could. Again, that was why I was assigning him to that boat as a mate to -- to maximize his exposure and OJT and as it turned out, he -- he was the -- he was the maintenance mate the day that that boat was due to get reviewed.

So, Mike -- Mike did under direction, I mean, he -- he pulled all the life jackets off, cleaned the life jackets. I told him what to look for, you know, as far as failure points and stress points and told him what he needed to take out and check to make sure it was here and it was there and how this should be set up, how that should be. He did all the work on that particular boat. So, he was very familiar with -- with all the safety equipment and where everything was and how everything worked before the -- before the incident because -- and by the way, that wasn't planning.

That was -- the fact that he got assigned to that boat on Tuesday and this happened on Saturday was happenstance. I mean there was no -- obviously no planning there. It -- it worked out that way.

1	MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So, about what time did
2	you first learn that that other mate told you
3	about the problem on the boat? Do you recall about
4	what time that was?
5	MR. SILVA: 1600 1610. When we got on
6	the scene, the reserve craft was finishing taking
7	passengers on board from the from the hull. So,
8	we weren't far behind.
9	MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Do you know who towed
10	the the Lady D from from where it was where
11	it eventually ended up and
12	MR. SILVA: The Lady the Lady D
13	drifted. After the Navy Reserve took the passengers
14	off, the Lady D drifted about a hundred maybe a
15	little more than a hundred yards in a southeasterly
16	direction at which point the fireboat, I'm not sure
17	which one, I think it was the mayor the A one.
18	The big long A one.
19	MR. NARIZZANO: D'Elasandro (phonetic
20	sp.).
21	MR. SILVA: Maybe it was D'Elasandro. Go
22	ahead.
23	MR. NARIZZANO: D'Elasandro.
24	MR. SILVA: Well, I think it was that

one, but I'm not sure which one it was. One of the two large fireboats. Put along the hip and then they towed it out into deeper water and I don't know whether they had the divers on board at that point or whether the other -- the next fireboat coming out brought the divers out, but I saw a smaller fireboat tied off to it after they had tied the hull off and gone into deeper water and then the Coast Guard Zodiac came along side to request information on the interior of the vessel.

At that point, Decoman (phonetic sp.) -I believe it was Decoman. Decoman or Decomen dealing
in salvage came out came out. They -- it's -- it's
my understanding that they, in fact, tied off to the
remains of the boat and pulled it into the fire dock.
That it was not police or fire personnel that towed
it in. I'm pretty sure it was Decoman.

He was the -- he was the salvage company standing by the fireboat and I understand that they towed it in.

The only other thing that may be of -- of -- have value to it is the -- the boat drifted. Appeared to be drifting even upside down very quickly in a southeasterly direction.

In the final pass that we made through the debris field, we were taking water over the bow and up into the -- halfway up the door. So, we had a good 2½/3 foot of chop just pass the -- just pass the Fort peninsula.

So, it -- it didn't appear to be like that when we first got out there. It -- it appeared flatter and I'm -- I'm saying that in all sincerity. It appeared. It may have been worse for all I know. I think there was a -- perception wasn't there. I mean we were looking for something else, but I don't remember it being that violent when we first went out. Okay.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Regarding the -- the certificate of inspections for -- for various vessels in your fleet, the route restrictions, are you familiar with the wording on -- on how they're -- the different boats --

MR. SILVA: The vast majority of them have the same routing. There are some slight differences. From an operating perspective with the exception of the Eagle which is a new -- one of our newer acquisitions to the fleet, the line from the Fort dock back to the Korean War Memorial is the line

1 that we use as the line of restriction for our boats 2 and that -- that conforms to the (inaudible). The -- the specific terminology I can't 4 tell you off the top of my head. 5 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. You say that 6 Korean War Memorial to? MR. SILVA: The Fort dock. We don't go 8 beyond the Fort Dock I mean other than a -- you know, 9 a turnover. 10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Right. 11 MR. SILVA: That's our furthest easterly 12 point on the south side of the river. The Korean War Memorial is our furthest easterly point on the north 13 side of the river. 14 15 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. The COI route restrictions do vary and do you know the significance 16 of that? 17 18 MR. SILVA: No, it -frankly, 19 assumption is that it -- it's just the -- whoever typed it, that's what they looked at. They looked at 20 21 the chart and said oh, it's this point here. 22 know, I don't think there's any rhyme. 23 My understanding is the intent is not to 24 -- not to go beyond the Fort peninsula

because you get into a different mortison (phonetic sp.) area and that's where it -- it comes together at the Fort McHenry peninsula. Then it opens back up into the -- the larger where the three branches of the river together and -- and it's -- it's a different body of water for all intents and purposes and my understanding is the intent is that the -- the boats should not venture into that area. You know, that that's -- that's not an operating water for us and the only time the boats are ever out there is when we're taking them back and forth to -- to service them with no passengers on board.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So, it's your understanding that even though the -- the COI wording may vary that the -- that in reality your operating restriction is that line that you observe?

MR. SILVA: I guess a clearer way to say it is that my understanding is that all the restrictions are inclusive in that area. That that area's inclusive in -- in all of the what the statements are.

I'm not saying we go there regardless of what they say. It's my understanding that is within the boundaries on the boats. Because all the boats

1	operated from that area originally when they when
2	Ron Morgan owned the fleet, that's where the fleet
3	the fleet left from the Tindecko (phonetic sp.) which
4	is Tindecko, the Korean War Memorial stop or
5	(inaudible).
6	So and that's quite honestly have I
7	read every single COI and and plotted it on the
8	chart, no, I haven't.
9	MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay.
10	MR. SILVA: And the Eagle the reason I
11	mentioned the Eagle is I believe the Eagle has a
12	has a larger area. It it's open for a larger
13	area.
14	MR. NARIZZANO: That includes Patapsco
15	River, Middle Branch and I believe that's also
16	capable of operating Middle River.
17	MR. SILVA: But even that boat is not
18	operated beyond the the Fort.
19	MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I think that's
20	about all I have for right now.
21	Commander, do you have any questions?
22	
23	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Just a
24	couple.

1	Okay. We talked about the captain's
2	reports and you said that you reviewed the captain's
3	report. Is that
4	MR. SILVA: The captain's do a daily in
5	affect log. It it logs the time in the time in
6	work, the time in the water, what boat they operated,
7	what mate they had.
8	It also provides space for them to write
9	anything on the log that they feel is appropriate.
0	Everything from used the last used the last
1	(inaudible) from the box or couldn't find a spare
_2	running bolt today, a masthead.
_3	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Okay.
4	MR. SILVA: It it gives them the
_5	opportunity to write anything they need to on that
6	sheet.
7	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: That's the
8 ـ	report we discussed earlier where there were
9	MR. SILVA: Yes.
20	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: were
21	minor discreps might be included and
22	MR. SILVA: Um-hum. That that
23	particular form is then included with the mate's time
24	sheet in reconciliation to their bank. It's

deposited in a safe that night. The following morning, it's removed from the safe and the -- the tickets and the cash are reconciled and the logs are imputed both to our payroll system and to the system Ed was talking about vis-a-vis the -- the disk.

If there is anything on the hard copy that indicates there's a problem with the boat, Kathy will make a copy of it and depending on -- on whose day it is -- if I'm out, then it obviously goes to Ed, but if I'm there, it's put in my box.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Okay.

MR. SILVA: Typically, I get there before the captains. Typically, I will go down to the boats and walk the boats and then I come back up to the office and do whatever I've got to do in the office. I'll get those reports from Kathy and then I go back down.

But, typically, I walk the boats, make sure they're tied in properly, and make sure they don't -- for some reason, plastic bags is a neverending battle. Make sure there's no bags in the prop and make sure an engine's not -- one's up and one's down which indicated there might be a problem. Check the ladders. Make sure nothing's broken and -- and

quite frankly, walking the boats to see how clean 1 2 they are because when the mates come in and the boat 3 they were on last night is dirty, they're going to -they're going to know it. 5 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: We talked about Frank at one point and you had indicated that 6 7 he's not ready for the bigger boats. 8 MR. SILVA: Yes. 9 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Is that 10 mainly because he's just a weekend captain and he 11 just doesn't have time, the experience in? 12 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Let's go ahead and pause 13 this tape. (Whereupon, off the record.) 14 15 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. We -- we're back 16 on -- on the record now. We paused there for a 17 couple of minutes. Here we go. 18 MR. SILVA: A considerable -- a lot of it 19 has to do with the expense of training and -- and to be as candid as I can --20 21 (Whereupon, off the record.) 22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. We're back on the 23 record. MR. SILVA: It -- it's a combination of 24

factors. Some of them less altruistic than I'd like to admit, but he operates the boat well. He does a good job where he is. Taking a boat out of service, train him, it's expensive to me and at this point of the year, I need them when he's available, i.e., the weekends and the dividend for me right now isn't really there. I mean I -- I don't gain anything. I have plenty of captains to drive the other boats.

Frank drives this boat good. Does a good job. Why -- you know, why take another boat out of service and -- and pay two captains to do nothing.

I'm sorry. It's -- it may sound a little altruistic, but that's -- that's kind of the bottom line.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Okay.

MR. SILVA: It's nothing against Frank. Frank's a nice guy. It's just I've got captains that can run the other boats. I don't -- I don't need Frank to run those boats.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Okay.

MR. SILVA: Don't tell him I said that.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: No. In talking about the weather and how observations are made and contact is made with the -- with the

captains, it sounds like you have a system in place where the weather's checked in the morning. You folks lay it out on the floor and if you notice something strange, you'll call into Kathy. She might issue the thing.

Sounds like there's a process in place.

I'm just wondering what happened Saturday in your opinion to why -- what information was not transported or transmitted earlier.

MR. SILVA: Well, three things happened that I know of. One was no weather. NOAA didn't call a weather alert. So, there would have been no weather alert for Kathy to pick up on early. The weather forecast in the morning had no -- there was no indication of anything like that as a possibility that I'm aware of and third, it came through so fast.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Um-hum.

MR. SILVA: And the system -- the system worked. It just came through so fast that by the time the system got -- got into gear, it was on us and John Glenn did what he should have done. He's the senior man on the water. He called the alert. He sent the boats to the bulkhead. He specifically confirmed with the one boat that they received a

message.

Kathy called up to fleet. I don't know - I don't know the details of that, but I have
confirmed with captains that they all got that
message from John.

I did that independently by the way. I pulled them aside and asked them what they heard. Slightly different, but they were the same -- same radio transmission, but slightly interpretation of it.

So, the system --

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. We'll pause once again.

(Whereupon, off the record.)

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. We're back on the record.

MR. SILVA: I guess I feel that the -there wasn't -- it wasn't a failure of the intent of
our system. It was a combination of -- of unusual
and -- and foreseen conditions that fell altogether
and I guess I'd like to point it a little bit in the
other direction and say of the five boats we had out
that day, four of them clearly get the message and
get to the bulkheads. Frank was the only one that

was -- that -- that was exposed, but he did, in fact, get the message. He did, in fact, hear Kathy call and he had no forewarning.

The mate, Mike, I don't know -- I don't know. You were at the -- the interview with Mike.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Yes.

MR. SILVA: Mike had a handheld anemometer around his neck and one of the things he was doing he was trying to get a feel for what it felt like on the boat at certain wind speeds. That's why he had it with him and he clocked, what did he say, 13 knots --

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Right.

MR. SILVA: -- before they left the dock. So, they had no reason to suspect that anything was going to be weird. It wasn't like -- it wasn't like it was blowing like hades out there and they pulled out into it. I mean they -- they were under the -- they were under the confirmed opinion that it was just going to be another run back and all hell broke loose and -- and they just didn't have -- they had no warning and by the time they got the warnings, they were already out there in -- in the middle of whatever the hell it was.

The other thing I wanted to stress on that is all the captains are told again that, you know, if -- if they make a call that the weather is dicey and they put their boat to a bulkhead or they call the office and say look it's getting a little -- you know, it's getting a little snotty out here for this boat, we don't question them. I mean it's the captain's -- it's the captain's license. It's the captain's call and he's responsible for the safety of himself and his passengers and they know that.

If somebody tells me, you know, I'm not feeling that good about the -- the chop out here right, I'll make a call whether I can use that boat inside or -- or whether I have to put the boat away and I try not to put the boat away because I don't want it to look like they're being penalized for it. I try to use it in the -- in the inner harbor if I can.

Reason for that is because we want to maintain that initiative. We don't want them to feel like they got to wait for the office to tell them to -- to shut it off or -- or to get out of harm's way.

Ed and I both feel strongly. That's a much safer way to run the fleet and if you write

everything down and say you've got to do this, this, this, this, and this which at one point we did do by the way, it -- it doesn't give them the latitude they should have as licensed captains to make decisions they need to make. And we do support it. I mean we support it with the best information we can give them, but we still want it to -- we want it to reside with the captain who's right there to make the right call and to support it when they make the call. Т don't know if that answers everything you asked. LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Can you remember a time that Frank had made that call that says I'm putting -- putting my boat to the bulkhead due to weather? MR. SILVA: I -- I can think of a couple of occasions in the past year or so where Frank has -- has suggested that we need a larger boat out at the Fort or -- or we need to move a boat to the -- to the inside loop or something like that. LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Due to weather conditions?

## NEAL R. GROSS

MR. SILVA: Weather, number of people out

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at the number of people at the Fort. The
particular direction of the wind, for instance.
There are certain wind directions that are that
are less favorable out there and they created a cross
draft and stuff. Where where he's identified that
he he wasn't as comfortable as he ought to be with
it and he just moved (inaudible).
That wasn't this that wasn't the
circumstances that day and they they were fat,
dumb, and happy out there because the weather was
good.
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: All right.
At the time the storm blew through, you were on your
vessel you said?
MR. SILVA: I was on my
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Your own
personal vessel?
MR. SILVA: Yes.
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Where was
that located again? Is that
MR. SILVA: Henderson's Mine.
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Henderson.
You got that map. That's right.
MR. SILVA: Here's Fells Point.

1	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Okay.
2	MR. SILVA: Here's Fort McHenry. I live
3	right there. The marina isn't on the map. The
4	marina that's the that big one there.
5	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Where it
6	says Henderson's Walk? Okay.
7	MR. SILVA: This extends out to BMC
8	goes this way. Henderson's come this way and I live
9	right there.
10	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: And how
11	would you describe the weather at that time?
12	MR. SILVA: Well, I I came up out of
13	my boat. You know, I was below. I came up because
14	of the (inaudible) and the screaming and I was heard
15	the boat the boat was being pelted by
16	something.
17	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Um-hum.
18	MR. SILVA: I wasn't sure whether it was
19	heavy raindrops or or hail or what. So, yes, I
20	mean it was severe enough so it got my attention and
21	from what I can tell from the time frame, that was
22	probably five minutes or less before before Frank
23	went over.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON:

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What was

the duration of the -- the weather blowing through that you can remember?

MR. SILVA: There were two parts to it the way I remember it and I may be wrong. I mean a lot of things happened real quick in that -- that condensed area.

The initial -- the really severe stuff lasted maybe 20 minutes.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Um-hum.

MR. SILVA: Because when I boarded the ten boat, John was able to bow into my marina successfully without -- without really have to corkscrew it in or -- or twist a corner off or anything. He came in pretty clean.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Um-hum.

MR. SILVA: And in the wind conditions that I've heard described, John wouldn't have been able to do that because he would have (inaudible). So, in -- in my opinion, between -- between the time I came up and the time John got there, there was a significant reduction in the wind speed and by the time we got back because I had him drop me back off at the dock so I could put some clothes on, I just came up in a t-shirt, he had -- he had trouble

getting on. He had to come on over one corner and then roll it in. The wind -- the wind had picked up again.

It's -- again, it seemed calm when we were out there trying -- trying to recover people,

relatively calm compared to the two extremes on the

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Where was -

MR. SILVA: And it didn't last long. It really didn't. Twenty minutes/half an hour at the most. I don't even think it lasted that long. The - the initial nasty conditions.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Where was John at when he made that call to the other captains?

Do you know?

MR. SILVA: I don't have it with me, but I have -- I had him write it down. I had the mate write down. I believe he was at -- I'm pretty sure he was at the oldest house of the allied rock area on his way back into Harbor Place about a third of the way from Fells Point, but I'm not sure. He was in that vicinity, but I'm not -- I'm not sure which direction he was going.

agenda.

1	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: About where
2	do you think?
3	MR. SILVA: Right in here I believe.
4	Yes. Pretty sure. Again I I've got that back in
5	the office. I I have a I have not reviewed it
6	yet, but I asked for it and I was told that that
7	it was turned in. I believe he was right in this
8	vicinity right here.
9	Unfortunately, this this map chart can
0 ـ	confuse you a little bit because the scale on this
1	side is is really marked down.
_2	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Really
_3	stretched.
4	MR. SILVA: Right.
_5	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: It's not
-6	MR. SILVA: This scale here is is
_7	pretty good, but this side is is really bad.
8 ـ	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: There's one
_9	up on the bridge. Can we grab that real quick?
20	Hopefully be helpful.
21	MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Let's let's
22	take a break.
23	MR. SILVA: John John would have been
24	heading in I believe and that was the direction it

1 came from. 2 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Okay. MR. SILVA: But, I'm -- we'd have -- we'd 4 have to review what he -- what he turned in because 5 I'm not --MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Let's just take a 6 7 quick break to get that chart. 8 (Whereupon, off the record.) 9 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. We're back on the 10 We're looking at a chart. Do we have a 11 number on that chart? 12281 is the chart number of the inner-harbor. 12 MR. SILVA: I believe they -- they were 13 somewhere in this vicinity right here. He -- I'm 14 15 guessing. We can get the hard paperwork back at the office. This is the normal route that he had talked 16 17 about as far as the return. All right. LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Okay. 18 19 MR. SILVA: So, J -- I believe JG was in this -- in this loop. There is a possibility that he 20 21

could have been in this mode, but he was in this general area. I'm not sure which -- which is the traverse area.

> LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: So, he --

22

23

Т	ne departed Fells Point and and was
2	MR. SILVA: I'm not sure at this point
3	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: The
4	direction that he was going in?
5	MR. SILVA: Yes, but I'm I'm almost
6	positive from the verbal description I got from him
7	that this was where they were when he got when
8	they made that initial call.
9	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: That's
0 ـ	that's between Fells Point and
1	MR. SILVA: PS7, the first stop. Yes.
_2	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Okay.
_3	MR. SILVA: This is Henderson's Marina.
4	This configuration right here.
_5	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: That's
6	where you were?
_7	MR. SILVA: That's where I am. This is a
8	little better representation of Fort McHenry. This
_9	is the Fort McHenry dock I believe. Right there.
20	MR. NARIZZANO: This is the neighboring -
21	- these areas. It's right there I think this
22	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: The last
23	one?
24	MR. NARIZZANO: Right by the floor is the

1	Fort dock. This one right here by whatever that name
2	is. The (inaudible). That's the fireboat dock. So,
3	we would have been leaving from here.
4	MR. SILVA: This is the Tindecko Korean
5	War Memorial right there. This little notch right
6	there.
7	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: And that's
8	the (inaudible) that you observed was
9	MR. SILVA: Operating right here. Yes, I
10	believe it you reference one of these buoys. One
11	of these two buoys and/or the lighthouse that's here.
12	Reference on our COS.
13	MR. NARIZZANO: (Inaudible) Point Light
14	is right here.
15	MR. SILVA: Yes, so here to here is the
16	furthest it could be construed as.
17	MR. NARIZZANO: Well, that's that's
18	some this this one I believe says I think it
19	says Tindecko and it's it's a it's a hard
20	point.
21	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Tindecko
22	MR. NARIZZANO: Tindecko is an area where
23	the Tindecko factory was now.
24	

ㅗ	MR. NARIZZANO: I don't know which one
2	you'd pick. It's it's a really strange point, but
3	the line of is is right in here and
4	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: To the Fort
5	peninsula?
6	MR. NARIZZANO: To to Locust Point.
7	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Locust
8	Point. Okay.
9	MR. NARIZZANO: So, I don't know so,
10	the other my boat Raven this was a clone of it was
11	Lazarato (phonetic sp.) Point right which is
12	(inaudible).
13	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Lazarato
14	Point.
15	MR. NARIZZANO: It's probably not marked
16	because it's not an active light light has do
17	it was I believe it's somewhere right I think
18	Lazarato Point's (inaudible). It's a little white
19	light. You know where you know where it is. To
20	Fort McHenry. So, it was right there. This
21	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: So, if it
22	say Tindecko to Locust Point, you're
23	MR. SILVA: I'm looking at it.
24	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON:

interpreted it as here not here where it says Locust 1 2 Point. Here. So, you wouldn't draw a line. MR. NARIZZANO: No. MR. SILVA: Well, I'm -- I'd be positive 5 that that wasn't the intent because these boats -when we purchased these boats, they were moored here. 6 7 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: 8 MR. SILVA: So, having a COI 9 identified this as the furthest easterly point would 10 be a bit ludicrous. So, my guess is that -- and --11 and again, my operating -- I've looked at them, but I never -- you know what I mean? I -- I just took this 12 as my line of demarkation. 13 14 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Um-hum. 15 MR. SILVA: And all the references that I saw were -- as far as I was concerned were -- were 16 17 within that. Again, based on knowledge that this is 18 where the boats were -- were docked before we bought 19 them. 20 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Okay. 21 MR. SILVA: And the COI was just a 22 continuation of what was on them when we got them. 23 So, that would -- that's where my reference came

from.

1 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: 2 MR. SILVA: I know I didn't go over them 3 I think and specifically look at each one of them and -- and maybe look at a chart and see which -- we 5 got charts down in the boats -- on our boats as well. 6 Probably this version. 7 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Okay. Do 8 you know where John Glenn put up against the bulkhead 9 when he got the word out to the other captains? 10 MR. SILVA: That's why I'm not 11 whether he's coming in or he was coming out and the behind him and saw 12 the configuration. mate was 13 Because he came to get me obviously pretty quick. 14 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Um-hum. 15 MR. SILVA: And he had an empty boat at 16 that point. So, either he already -- either he had 17 an empty boat on his way back in which is common and 18 you drop all your passengers off. He was coming in 19 empty and that's when I got a hold of him and then he came out to get me or he had -- he had locked into 20 21 this pier. 22 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: 23 Discharged his passengers. MR. SILVA: When I called -- called him and told him to come and 24

get me, he just spun out of Fells Point and came 1 2 over. That's what I'm not sure about. LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Okay. When 4 you asked him to come and get you, the storm was 5 pretty much -- (inaudible) had passed at that point? MR. SILVA: The boat was already over at 6 that point. So, the -- the worse of that was over. 7 8 Yes. 9 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Okay. 10 MR. SILVA: Like I said, John was able to 11 -- John was able to two-point land in my dock. 12 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Um-hum. So, which he couldn't do on 13 MR. SILVA: 14 the way back in. On the way back in, he had to put a 15 corner on and roll it. It was relatively calm when he picked me 16 It was a fairly short period of time after the 17 up. 18 accident. You know, minutes not -- not hours. Minutes after the accident. 19 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: 20 You had 21 mentioned before that one of the other live aboards 22 at the marina you're staying at --23 MR. SILVA: Um-hum. 24 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: -- said to

you that number one boat has a problem. 1 2 MR. SILVA: Yes. LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Do you 4 remember what time that was? 5 MR. SILVA: I think it was like 1605 --1610. I wasn't really watching a clock. I'm basing 6 that time reference on other time references I've heard from like the Naval Reserve guys and the fire 8 9 guys who I'm assuming had more accurate logs as far 10 as the time was concerned. 11 I was on the scene when Navy Reserve boat 12 was still taking passengers out of the water. 13 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: 14 MR. SILVA: So, that's -- that's what I'm 15 -- if it was -- it was roughly 1605/1610 when I left 16 It was about ten minutes later. So, it would 17 have 1615/1620 when we got on the scene which is 18 about -- because they were discharging passengers 19 from that -- from the Navy Reserve boat by about 1630

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: How long after you started to experience significant weather on your boat until the time your neighbor said the number one boat as a problem would you estimate?

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from what I understand.

1	MR. SILVA: Less than five minutes. Less
2	than five.
3	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: So, the
4	weather came through
5	MR. SILVA: The weather hit the boat. I
6	went up into the cockpit to check it. When I came up
7	into the cockpit, I believe she may have been coming
8	to get me.
9	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Um-hum.
10	MR. SILVA: She's in the boat directly in
11	front of me. When she saw me come up in the cockpit
12	she yelled back to me there's a problem on the one
13	boat.
14	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: And how did
15	she know about that again?
16	MR. SILVA: Her husband was operating one
17	of the other boats in the fleet.
18	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Okay. She
19	has
20	MR. SILVA: And she was on channel 71.
21	She was monitoring channel 71 and that's how she
22	heard about it. I was not monitoring 71.
23	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Okay.
24	MR. SILVA: Ed had already yelled at me.

1 So, I had turned the radio off. Ed told me it was 2 my day off to stop bothering him with the questions. 3 I'm piecing the time line together based 4 on the -- the Naval Reserve and the fire 5 reports. 6 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER You HAMMON: 7 mentioned once you got in the boat with John, you got 8 on the scene and circled around and then after you 9 were told or released from the scene you went and looked for debris. 10 11 MR. SILVA: No, we did that first. 12 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: You did 13 that first. What was the furthest point for you finding debris? How far out --14 15 MR. SILVA: The hospital ship -- I think the hospital ships here. Isn't that it? 16 MR. NARIZZANO: I think so. 17 I'm not 18 sure. MR. SILVA: I think it's here. 19 It's either here or --20 MR. NARIZZANO: Yes, it might be --21 22 MR. SILVA: I think it's here. 23 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: I think 24 it's that one.

MR. SILVA: Yes. We found debris to about here. Actually, the last piece of debris we found was not debris. It was an orange barrel. We thought it was debris, but it was an orange street barrel.

From that point, we went out to just before the hospital ship, did a 180, and started a z search with the -- the captain, myself, and the mate doing a -- a water search --

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Um-hum.

MR. SILVA: -- through the debris field. From here, we came back out and made a -- a search back through here. The Coast Guard zodiac caught up to us about here. I think we're pretty much right off the -- maybe a little inside the buoy and we had begin to pick up -- pick up some of the debris as we got this close. That's when he questioned us about the -- the interior configuration on the vessel.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Okay.

MR. SILVA: And indicated that everything was clear and that we -- we were free to leave the zone and then we picked up the rest of the debris and went in.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: Did you

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happen to notice what time it was when you were down here to -- for this part of the debris?

MR. SILVA: I can give you -- I mean an educated guess would be no later than quarter to five -- 1645. Because once we started the -- the collection of boats which was very intense around the hull and there -- there literally wasn't much more room beyond us traversing through it just to make sure there was nobody else in the immediate area.

My next thought was to get as far down wind as I could and then z pattern my way back through the debris field to see any of that had been -- had been swept away at the scene and it wasn't long. We didn't -- we didn't hang around. We just -- we went through the -- through the -- through the area where the boat was and then -- and then very quickly went down -- down -- down wind at the marina.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: From your position on your boat when the storm was going through, what direction was the wind going?

MR. SILVA: I believed it was a -- a northwesterly/westerly direction based on -- on my boat -- the direction -- my boat was scaling to port and bow east. My boat was (inaudible) hard to port

all my lines were rocking like hell typically indicates it's a stern -- just for the (inaudible) stern when it goes that -- which is the typical wind pattern this time of year. So. guessing it was kind of like here. Through this right here. From here to here. When we came back in later on, that was the direction of the wind when we came back in and it had picked up quite a bit and again, it -- it was not -- the wind was not that severe when we went out. When we left my dock, it was not. I'm guessing no more than 15 or 20. Higher than that when we came back in though. LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAMMON: That's all the follow-on questions I have. MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Tom ROTH-ROFFY back again. Just a couple more. Could you give us the name of the -- of the -- the individual that first notified you that -of the problem with the one boat? Mary Hine (phonetic sp.). MR. SILVA: She's on the list that Graham (phonetic sp.) had. MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. MR. SILVA: She's on that mate list.

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1 George Hine's wife. Somewhere in there I called you. 2 I talked to you on the phone. I guess I may have 3 talked to Kathy and she was talking to you on the phone. 5 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Yes, she called me. MR. SILVA: Yes, because Kathy called me 6 7 and asked if there was any reason. If -- if I wanted 8 you to come down there and get picked up off a 9 bulkhead. Right. (Inaudible). 10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Right. So, when you 11 first arrived at the scene of the accident, what I'd like you to do is -- is -- is verbalize what you were 12 13 kind of pointing to on the -- on the chart because 14 it's going to -- it's going come to -- to -- to 15 So, referring to landmarks or really go back. 16 whatever, if you could just vocalize that. We came out the west channel 17 MR. SILVA: from the Henderson's Marina which would be identified 18 19 at the tip of Fells Point just north of the ST and the northwest channel. 20 21 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Again, we're 22 referring to charter 12281. 23 MR. SILVA: For the most part, followed 24 the west channel out. As we came a beam of the Naval

Reserve Center and the old grain elevator at Locust Yards, we began to be able to identify the scene of the incident through the location of -- of the Navy Reserve boat and a couple of minutes, we were able to identify the upturned boat itself and the passengers on board the Navy vessel. MR. ROTH-ROFFY: About what location was that on the chart if you can recall? MR. SILVA: It would have been probably 100 yards to 150 yards in a -- a northwesterly direction from G7 on this chart. G7 is the -- a MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. buoy marking the channel? MR. SILVA: Um-hum. MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. MR. SILVA: We proceeded in the direction of the -- of the obvious rescue. At that point, the vessels involved in the rescue were in the -- between the two cable and pipeline areas marked on the chart, between G5 and G3 off of Lazarato Point. For the most part, they were right here. There's too many 38 water decks to -- to use that as an identified, but that's where the boats were.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Maybe you could say off

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-- off to the west of the Cole (phonetic sp.) Pier possibly.

MR. SILVA: Yes, I guess the -- yes, it would be to the west of the 25 foot area on the chart. Right. That's the only 25 foot area right there. Right about here.

Proceeded through that area and determined that there were no other people in the water at that time and that there was an adequate number of boats recovering those that -- if there were more, there was an adequate number of boats to pick them up.

We proceed from there out the main channel to our 2NH and began to track the debris field out towards the hospital ship, the Comfort, located in the -- appears on the northern side of the channel adjacent to marker GC5.

From there, maintained a zigzag pattern from there back to our 2NH. Repeated that a second time with a wider sweep and on the remain -- the -- the next trip in, began to pick up the -- the debris so it wouldn't be misidentified and somewhere in the vicinity of 2NH, I believe it was probably slightly north and west of 2NH, the Coast Guard zodiac came

_	along side and asked for interior dimensions on the
2	vessel and I believe that rest of them would have
3	been right here in the (inaudible).
4	MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You're indicating on the
5	chart to what area? Just off of Lazarato Point?
6	MR. SILVA: Just almost directly off of
7	Lazarato Point and approximately the 44-foot mark.
8	MR. ROTH-ROFFY: When you did your z
9	pattern search to the southeast of the where the
0	recovery was taking place, were there any other boats
_1	actively searching for
_2	MR. SILVA: No, that's (inaudible).
_3	There was no one else in the debris field at that
4	time.
_5	MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And you on your own
-6	decided to to do that search pattern down there?
_7	MR. SILVA: Um-hum. Couldn't get the
8_	Coast Guard. I'm not slamming the Coast Guard. We
_9	couldn't raise them on 22.
20	MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You tried
21	MR. SILVA: I called them on 22 to
22	identify the vessel, telling them we were scene to
23	assist and I couldn't get anybody. I mean there was
24	a lot of confusion obviously.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You called -- could you 1 2 describe why you couldn't get them? There's a lot of 3 confusion, a lot of traffic and they just didn't hear you or -- or you couldn't get -- get out? 5 communication was not transmitted or --MR. SILVA: I'm not sure. I don't know. 6 7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: But, there was a lot of 8 -- of radio activity? 9 MR. SILVA: Yes. 10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. 11 SILVA: At probably ten minutes 12 later, yes, maybe ten minutes later when I was out 13 here coming back. I had already called my Fort 14 people and identified the number of passengers on 15 board and cross confirmed it. So, I -- I knew what I was talking about. I again called 22 and I don't 16 I think I got either group or --17 think I got a boat. 18 or -- actually who I got, but it didn't sound like a 19 boat. 20 Because when I did talk to the boats, the boat background noise was there. 21 There wasn't any 22 background noise. So, it's probably on the 23 recording.

I was able to raise the Coast Guard and

identified myself and gave them the information visa-vis how many passengers there were on board the I'm not sure if I identified the intended vessel. route of the vessel or not. Just I do know that I identified the number of passengers on board and I know I repeatedly asked for a count and I wasn't able to get one. So, when the guys came aboard, that probably is what promoted me to believe they were telling me they got them all. From there on, I did have communication with the Coast Guard. Both -- both whoever was in the office space and the zodiacs -- the zodiac. MR. ROTH-ROFFY: When you came down to the south, are you fairly certain you got to the very end of the debris field? MR. SILVA: Absolutely positive. MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. MR. SILVA: I went well beyond it. Well beyond it and then MR. ROTH-ROFFY: you reversed course and -- and went through the debris field. MR. SILVA: A hundred to 150 yards beyond it before I did the 180.

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MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And about how long would 1 2 you say that debris field was the extent of it from -MR. SILVA: Well, this was not the end of 5 the debris field. This was the end of what we considered to be the debris field. 6 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Could you describe that? 8 What you're pointing --9 MR. SILVA: That was the -- that's where 10 that -- that street barrel was. At that buoy there. 11 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Which buoy is that? 12 MR. SILVA: R18. 13 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: That's --The debris -- on our first 14 MR. SILVA: 15 pass, the debris was primarily located around RH --16 Then that buoy was -- would have been the shore side of that. Probably 100 yards on either 17 18 side of it when we first passed through it. The last 19 item we identified through the orange color was at 20 approximately at R18 and when we got that far, we 21 identified it as an orange street barrel, 22 construction- type street barrel. 23 We proceeded further. Made 180 our 24 degree turn which would have put us right about in here and then we began our zigzag pattern back.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Again, will you please. If you could vocalize that.

MR. SILVA: Okay. C3 in 2 -- RN2 and in C -- GC3. That was the area where we made our -- our 180 degree turn and began our z pattern back into the debris field.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay.

MR. SILVA: So, we were well -- well beyond the field before we turned around.

The way the wind was blowing, it was -it was pretty blatantly obvious to me that anything
that was on the surface was going to continue
traveling with the debris field and that the -- the
prudent thing I could do at that point was to get
beyond the debris field and work my way back through
it ensuring that there was nobody being driven out
with the tide and the wind and we -- we did that
maneuver twice before we removed the debris -- the
debris.

At that point, we had helicopters on the scene and I know from past experience that the -- the helicopters have a hard time or I don't know with the -- the new infrared stuff it's not a problem, but it

used to be a major problem for them. The --1 2 debris in the water looked like life jackets and 3 Was a major problem for the aircrafts. stuff. The floats that we did not pick up 5 intentionally. There were a couple of seat planks, red and cream. Red on the bottom. Cream on the top. 6 7 I intentionally did not pick those up as markers. 8 So, that, you know, in -- in -- in our next or -- or 9 subsequent passes, we'd have something identified 10 that was part of the original debris. 11 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. 12 SILVA: We did have another boat MR. standing by to join the search, but when we were 13 14 relieved, I sent him in, too. 15 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Where was he standing 16 by? Right here. Originally, he 17 MR. SILVA: 18 was standing by to take passengers -- the remaining 19 passengers from Fort McHenry and when they told us the activity would prohibit that, we arranged to have 20 21 a van take them and I had the boat remain on station 22 until I -- I determined through the contract with the 23 Coast Guard that it was -- they didn't need the boat.

Okay.

ROTH-ROFFY:

MR.

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Could

describe that in words where that boat was standing by?

MR. SILVA: The second vessel, the Patrick Duffy Number 9 would have been standing by approximately 100 yards in a northerly direction off of the Naval Reserve Station.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. During your years of operating boats in -- in this -- this area, have you ever experienced a -- a wind condition similar to -- to what -- what happened last Saturday afternoon?

MR. SILVA: That's a hard question to The reason it's a hard question to answer I -- I don't know what Frank experienced. I know what I heard Mike say. I know what I heard Frank say and I would have to answer no based on what I understand those guys ran into up there. I've never experienced anything that -- that twisted a boat around it and that -- that did what -- what they -- what both of them happened to that boat, I've say never experienced that.

It was -- it was pretty traumatic from what I could tell from their -- from their conversations and some of the verbiage that Frank used clearly indicated that he -- he knew what to do.

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I mean he -- he used the back and turn maneuver to spin the boat around. He -- he attempted to fall off, pick up speed, and come back into it to -- to minimize his profile to weather. I mean he did all the right stuff and it -- it wouldn't happen.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Could you describe that backing maneuver? When would that have occurred?

MR. SILVA: After he left the pier. I believe it's in Frank's deposition or his interview.

When Frank began to leave the pier, the wind was picking up and one of the things I've taught the small boat operators is that these boats will back very effectively into the weather.

Number one is present a small profile and number two, your steering -- the engine is your steering mechanism and your steering mechanism is directly at the wind. So, you can pull those boats into the wind quite easily.

And you use that backing maneuver. You bring the wheel around which is -- which will pull your stern off the wind and then shift to full and power back up again and now you're in a position where you got plenty of room to make a sweep turn as opposed to a very small amount of room when you were

1 initially coming off the dock. 2 So, it affords you the opportunity to get 3 more operating room to get the boat to a clear --4 into clear -- clear water and -- and better air and 5 Frank did that. 6 Frank said the boat twisted twice at 7 least from the -- from the way I remember what he 8 I mean he thought he had it into the wind and 9 then it just corkscrewed on him. 10 So, no, I've never experienced anything 11 like that on there. 12 experienced heavy winds Have we 13 there? Yes. 14 Have I ever had anything catastrophic 15 with them? No. 16 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Have you ever experienced winds such that you were in -- in fear of 17 18 capsizing the boat? 19 MR. SILVA: Honestly, no. Probably for two -- two reasons. One, when -- it's going to sound 20 21 like a brag. I know what I'm doing and if -- if I 22 got myself into a situation like that, I would put the boat into the wind very quickly and find a hole 23 24 to hide in just as fast and -- and I wouldn't get --

it wouldn't be a scary thing. It would be a do it thing. Maybe afterwards it would be -- I'll go get a B&L.

No, not -- I -- I borne into -- I mean the whole first year I was here. I did a four on the

the whole first year I was here, I did a four on the -- on the table. So, now, I was in that -- in that area with a similar boat, a slightly larger boat, but a similar boat. It's an open boat. It doesn't have walls, but it's the same run, single screw run.

No, the way that -- the way these conditions were described by those two guys, I'm not aware of anything like it that I've run across.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I have one more. How many passengers were left behind at the Fort that you had to arrange transportation for?

MR. SILVA: There's a little bit of contradiction in the verbal reports I got. At one point, it was seven or eight who were intending to take the next trip which would have been the last trip. Then I heard that some of them took alternative ground transportation.

I know Kathy arranged for and/or came out herself with a van to pick those people up and I believe I heard her on the radio saying that there

was no one but the Fort coordinator left to pick up. 2 The Fort coordinator's log will clearly 3 You subtract how many -- you'd set up how indicate. 4 many came out and how many went back and whatever's 5 left over is what should have been there for that last trip and initially, I believe it was seven or 6 eight from the conversations I had with the Fort 8 coordinator. 9 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Was anyone able to their 10 names, contact numbers, and whatnot? 11 MR. SILVA: I honestly don't know. I doubt it. I doubt it. 12 I mean I wasn't in the position to and I was quite frankly up to my ass in 13 14 alligators at that point. 15 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Where is the Fort coordinator typically stationed at? 16 MR. SILVA: Well, he used to have this 17 18 nice little house, but, you know, now he hangs around 19 -- this is a parking lot. This -- this -- these two blocks right here I'm -- I'm guessing without any --20 21 anymore definition here. This would be the firehouse 22 right here. 23 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: It's the building where 24 the command center is at now?

1 MR. SILVA: Yes. 2 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. MR. SILVA: Yes. There's a -- a metal 4 fence that separates it from Fort McHenry. 5 up behind the -- the parking lot area here. MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Right. 6 7 MR. SILVA: And right now Bill stands --8 there's a -- there's a gate in that metal fence. 9 Bill stands on the Fort side of that gate and/or 10 between there and the rest rooms if -- if the 11 weather's bad. Get some protection from the rest 12 room area, but he coordinates the people on the Fort 13 side of the gate. 14 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. And what's his 15 name again? 16 MR. SILVA: Bill Thompson. I believe he's on that list that I gave you. 17 Bill's -- Bill's function is to keep 18 19 everyone who's returning on the Fort side of the When a boat comes in, they discharge their 20 gate. 21 Those passengers work their way up to passengers. 22 the Fort with Bill Thompson and usually they confirm that count back and forth and then Bill will send him 23

down whatever he has up to 23.

No one is allowed on the fire department side of that gate except those who are boarding the boat and that's -- that's intention. That's part of our agreement with the fire department.

So, Bill -- once there are people at the Fort, that -- that's where Bill's going to be right in the general area controlling it and he has a -- a BHF.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay.

MR. SILVA: And he's in direct communication with the boat all the time vis-a-vis how many people coming up, how many people he's sending back down, are the people off the dock already clear, hold on, I got two more people. Whatever.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Does he ever go down to the pier and assist with putting passengers on the boat or is that the skipper and the mates responsibility?

MR. SILVA: My understanding is obviously at the end of the day and the beginning of the day when he's coming and going, he's involved in that. But, I don't believe -- I don't believe he does mostly because our -- our commitment to the fire

1 department is not to allow people to go from Fort 2 McHenry into the fire department area. MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Um-hum. MR. SILVA: And if Bill were -- if Bill 5 were also assisting loading passengers, that -- that would be somewhat of a problem as far as keeping 6 7 people -- keeping people out. Unless he's -- you 8 know, unless he's got a lock for the gate now that 9 I'm not aware of and he locks the gate. Because then 10 it helps him. I don't think it's the case. 11 I mean when we had the old pier, we did 12 Bill was on the pier in a little house we do that. had on it and we did, in fact lock the gate so that 13 people couldn't go on the pier and when the boats 14 15 came in, they would open the gate and count out x 16 amount of people. The -- the appropriate number of 17 people for whatever boat was coming in. 18 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Do you know if 19 witnessed the accident? Did anyone talk to him? No, I don't know. 20 MR. SILVA: I don't 21 know. 22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: What does the -- the 23 Fort coordinator do when the boat is not, you know,

at the dock? Does he have other duties?

MR. SILVA: He would be -- his primary responsibility at that point is to talk to the people. For the most part, wile away the time so that they don't -- they could conceivably have to wait a half an hour especially if they just missed the boat or if the boat was full. So, Bill's primary function is to kind of make that time go as fast as he can for them and tell them about the Fort and other things of historic interest, so on.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay.

MR. SILVA: Kind of an almsman. Well -- he's great at it. Older gentleman.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I think we're probably out of questions for right now. Again, we have some other stuff -- information we'd like to get from you and we'd appreciate if you could speak with us again in the future if we -- if we need to talk to you and we appreciate you now coming down and -- and spending the time with us. I know it's kind of tedious, but we thank you very much

And the time is now about 1600. That will conclude our -- our interview of Mr. Ron Silva, the Fleet Captain.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 4:00 the interview as concluded.)